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ABSTRACT 
 
INDIVIDUALS’ TAX INCENTIVES AND THE VALUE OF TRANSPARENCY OF 
INFORMATION 
 
Önsel Gürel Bayralı 
Political Science, M.A. Thesis, August 2018 
Thesis Advisor: Assoc. Prof. Özge Kemahlıoğlu 
Keywords: Collective Action, Political Institutions, Political Fundamentals,  
Public Finance, Global Games. 
 
This study will analyze the collective action problem with respect to tax contributions by 
concentrating on the effects of public and private information about political institutions and 
transparency levels of information sources on individuals’ tax decisions by using global 
games. The analysis also aims to resolve collective action problem among agents during their 
tax decision processes by proposing strategic complements namely Keynesian beauty contest 
and political fundamentals. The rationale and novelty of this analysis are to provide insights 
into the state-individuals and individual-individual connections of the tax decision process at 
the same time. Moreover, the analysis construes the effects of the transparency of information 
on social welfare.  
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ÖZET 
 
BİREYLERİN VERGİ VERME İSTEKLERİ VE BİLGİNİN ŞEFFAFLIĞININ DEĞERİ 
 
Önsel Gürel Bayralı 
Siyaset Bilimi, Yüksek Lisans Tezi, Ağustos 2018 
Tez Danışmanı: Doç. Dr. Özge Kemahlıoğlu 
 
Anahtar Sözcükler: Müşterek Eylem, Siyasal Kurumlar, Siyasi Esaslar, 
Kamu Maliyesi, Küresel Oyunlar. 
 
Bu çalışma siyasal kurumlar hakkında kamusal ve bireysel düzeydeki bilgi kaynaklarının 
şeffaflığının müşterek eylem sorunu olarak adlandırılan bireylerin vergi verme istekleri 
üzerindeki etkisini küresel oyun teorisi üzerinden incelemektedir. Ayrıca bu çalışma 
bireylerin vergi verme kararlarını alırken ortaya çıkan müşterek eylem sorununu Keynes’in 
güzellik yarışması ve siyasi esaslar terimlerini stratejik tamamlayıcılar olarak kullanıp 
aşmayı planlamaktadır. Bu çalışmanın önemli katkılarından bir tanesi de vergi verme 
kararının alındığı sürecin önemli boyutlarından olan devlet-birey ve birey-birey arasındaki 
ilişkiyi aynı anda değerlendirmesidir. Ayrıca bu çalışma, bilginin şeffaflığının sosyal refah 
üzerindeki etkisini de incelemektedir.  
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
This study will analyze the collective action problem with respect to tax contribu-
tions by concentrating on the effects of public and private information about political
institutions and transparency levels of information sources on individuals’ tax deci-
sions by using global games which are static and incomplete information games. The
analysis will concentrate on coordination failure that may lead to tax evasion prob-
lem even though people are aware of the fact that cooperating with each other and
paying their taxes enable them to obtain more benefit.
The main rationale and novelty of this research is the attempt of implying the struc-
ture of global games on understanding individuals’ tax decisions to observe the way
in which information sources are capable of compensating coordination problems
among people. Another significant contribution that this study tries to make is to
combine the two different models, Morris and Shin (2002) and Angeletos and Pavan
(2004), that have different conclusions. The main logic why this study attempts to
combine them is to scrutinize clearly the positive and negative impacts of strategic
complements at the same time.1 Additionally, this study aims to propose a new
concept for the political science literature by crystallizing the term political fun-
1Chapter 4 will discuss in detail the main logic behind why this study aims to combine these
two models.
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damentals2 which define the political conjuncture based on the quality of political
institutions. This new concept enables us to elaborate political institutions in the
game theoretic analysis of the collective action problem with respect to tax collec-
tion. Lastly, this paper comes up with an idea which tries to combine Keynesian
beauty contest term, which is mostly used in researches analyzing financial markets,
with political science literature. The main aim of this attempt is to understand
the effect of people’s actions on individuals’ political decisions and to emphasize the
importance of individual-individual relations in tax decisions with the help of the
beauty contest term.
In this sense, construing the source and content of information3 may be a solution
manual for this uncertainty problem because these resources enable individuals to
follow the current political environment, the types of policymakers and the institu-
tional structure of the state. In other words, those are significant indicators to test
the capability of office holders whether they can run effective public policy. Also,
people can examine the capacity of political institutions whether they can audit and
limit public investments that are not beneficial for public interest. Hence, a taxpayer
would be able to combine her private information with the public one and she may
reach more effective results compared to the uncertain environment. However, as
Topbas (2016) states that combining these information sources and evaluating the
importance of them during the decision-making process also may lead to uncertainty
problem due to their noisy structures. The analysis will propose strategic comple-
ments to attract people to cooperate and to compensate indeterminacy caused by
the noisy structure of information. Strategic complement refers to an action which
may have potential benefits of two agents that even though they do not control the
actions of each other, they know that their strategies are mutually beneficial for them.
This work will propose concepts, namely political fundamentals and Keynesian beauty
2Researchers using global games elaborate on their discussions with respect to economic funda-
mentals which define the basics of the current economic conjuncture.
3This study proposes transparency level of information as the tool to compensate coordination
failure among individuals to direct them to reach socially optimal level. Nevertheless, information
structures do not have omnipotent power because we do not live in a world in which transaction
cost is zero. Hence, even if information structures would propose full transparency, deciphering the
environment we are living makes information useless at some point.
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contest as strategic complements and will discuss the impact of them on individuals’
tax decisions in the theoretical part. Political fundamentals delineate the institu-
tional structure of the state based on the rule of law and horizontal accountability,
which enables people to understand whether the state institutions can construct im-
personal trust between the state and individuals. Keynesian beauty contest or the
second-guess motive is an imaginary concept that forces a person to decide as close
as possible to other people’s decisions. This motive, in this analysis, will be used to
measure the degree of the collective action incentive among people.
After sorting out the benchmark model and the equilibrium analysis respectively,
this study will propose the primary results of the analysis. In this realm, this paper
will focus on two main areas. First, the analysis will scrutinize the impact of the
level of transparency of public and private information on individuals’ tax incentives.
In addition to focus on transparency levels, this work will discuss Keynesian beauty
contest based on individual level. The second, this paper will concentrate on the
influence of the above variables on social welfare function. This work will set welfare
function as the aggregate level of utility functions of every individual within the spe-
cific range defined in the benchmark model. The welfare analysis will enable us to
observe the potential danger of noisy structures of information resources, the ability
of strategic complements to compensate for this problem and the impact of political
fundamentals. Additionally, global games literature does not have a standard con-
clusion about the welfare effects of the transparency level of information sources, so,
this article will aim to contribute to this debate.
The rest of the study will be organized as follows. In chapter 2, this thesis will
summarize the related literature and in chapter 3, it will crystallize concepts the-
oretically. After elaborating the equilibrium in chapter 4, the study will analyze
the results of the equilibrium in chapter 5. Then, chapter 6 will delineate the main
conclusion of the thesis and propose alternative questions for the further research.
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
Collective action problem is one of the essential characteristics of tax decision. Even
though people are aware of the potential benefits of collective contributions, since
they cannot coordinate, reaching the optimum level of tax revenue is almost impossi-
ble for governments. In this regard, this study tries to understand how the collective
action problem regarding individuals’ tax decisions can be solved. For this aim, the
analysis sorts out the way in which public and private information and their trans-
parency levels can resolve this problem.
Mancur Olson (1965) can be counted as one of the first scholars who discussed that
“rational self-interested individuals will not act to achieve their common or group
interests.” (1965:2) After Olson, the collective action became a problem because he
underlined the non-excludability of the public good provision. Hardin (1971) inter-
preted the Olson’s collective action problem within the structure of the Prisoner’s
Dilemma. Also, Buchanan (1965) provided a new approach which proposes a public
good based on the characteristics of club goods. Ostrom (2000), however, opened a
new perspective by focusing on the Olson’s collective action problem. Even if she
does not disregard the Olson’s thesis, her main assertion is that collective action
problems can be resolved with the incentive of cooperation among society based on
laboratory experiments and field research. For the model of tax evasion, Allingham
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and Sandmo (1972) designed a model which suggested that tax compliance depends
on the probability of detection, tax rate and the penalty of tax evasion. Moreover,
Kirchler, Hoelzl and Wahl (2008) analyzed individuals’ tax decisions based on the
slippery slope framework. They tried to analyze the dynamic interaction between
power and trust to understand the enforced and voluntary compliance dimensions of
tax commitments.
While we focus on the literature of information economics, Morris and Shin (2002)
and Morris, Shin and Tong (2006) stated that an increase in the transparency of pub-
lic information reduces social welfare. The main logic behind this proposition is that
while there are optional information resources, an improvement in the transparency
level of public information may lead to over-reaction and people give up using their
own private information. Hellwig (2002) also underlined that if public information
is relatively more informative than private information or the overall level of noise
is not enough; the coordination failure cannot be compensated. Hence, the multiple
equilibria may deteriorate social welfare.
Svensson (2006) critiques Morris et al. (2002) and claimed that more transparent
public information is generally useful. Only under specific conditions, the precision
of public information may have a negative impact.
In contrast to Morris et al. (2002), Angeletos and Pavan (2004) studied complemen-
tarities within the social level at which they concluded that an improvement of the
precision of public information always increases welfare. Angeletos and Pavan (2007)
reaches the same conclusion by focusing on payoff convexities. Nevertheless, Topbas
(2016) has found a different result by analyzing investment complementarities within
and between periods, which is close to Morris and Shin’s (2002) findings. Topbas
(2016) stated that until the period at which private information is relatively more
precise and complementarities are sufficiently low, full transparency condition for
public information is optimal.
In the literature, coordination failure related to strategic complements is also widely
analyzed. Cooper and Andrew (1988) can be one of the first discussions that explain
this issue. Also, Carlsson and van Damme (1993) studied this problem and stated
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that sufficiently precise private information may be enough to reach a unique equi-
librium as Morris and Shin (1998) did.
In the literature, researches are also combining global games and taxation. Adaman
and Mumcu (2010), for instance, find a negative relation with government effective-
ness and the size of informality and they propose a U-shape connection between tax
rates and the size of informality. Also, the tax literature contains studies focusing on
the effects of accountability and transparency on tax performances of countries. In
this realm, Bird, Martinez-Vazquez and Torgler (2008) propose that state responsive-
ness and accountability improves tax performances in both developing and developed
countries. Bird et. al (2008) focuses on the importance of political institutions like
improving the rule of law or decreasing corruption. In this way, they may obtain
more tax revenues because of the impersonal trust constructed between the state and
individuals. Impersonal trust is an important concept in political science literature.
Levi (1993) and Hardin (1993) focus on the state-individual relation in the context
of public policy of governments and underline that an effective public policy can
be possible by constructing impersonal trust via empowering laws. Anderson and
Guillory (1997) discussed the influence of characteristics of political institutions on
the Western democracies with a cross-country analysis. They found out that the
systems that are more consensual create satisfaction (trust) for losers comparing to
the majoritarian structures. Rothstein and Stolle (2008) captured the causal mecha-
nism between effective, impartial and fair street-level bureaucracies with trust based
on cross-country analysis. They, additionally, underlined that rather than cultural
aspect trust as a social capital, the institutional theory can explain the generalized
trust (impersonal trust) explicitly. Rothstein and Stolle (2002) also elaborated on
the point that the poor quality of political institutions may destroy trust as a social
capital.
Another path of the tax literature sorts out the nexus of state capacity and the tax
revenues of states. In this context, there are researches focusing on the connection
between regime types and the states’ capabilities of collecting taxes. Cheibub (1998),
for instance, argues that in contrast to Przeworski (1990) and Olson’s (1991) asser-
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tions, the incapability of democracies of collecting taxes comparing to dictatorship is
an ambiguous point. Besley and Persson (2009), moreover, point out the importance
of common interest public goods, political stability and inclusive political institu-
tions to build state capacity and an enlargement of the state capacity leads to an
increase in tax revenues of governments as Fukuyama (2014) states. In this regard,
Steinmo’s (1993) analysis requires a special attention to elaborate on the importance
of political institutions for the states’ tax performances. He states that rather than
concentrating on the social values of a country to understand its level of taxation, the
structure of political institutions and decision-making mechanisms are the decisive
factors.
Lastly, global games is an important game theoretic strategy in the political economy
literature. Gole (2013), for example, concentrates on coordination, cooperation and
the governance of institutions within the frame of global games. He analyzes the
importance of public information in decision-making process based on these three
different categories. Moreover, Kocak (2014) uses global games to scrutinize the role
of social media in press freedom and its effect on government accountability. He
proposes a unique equilibrium which states that social capital as an output of the
internet usage can improve the press freedom and voters welfare.
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CHAPTER 3
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
This part of the analysis tries to elaborate the basic concepts used in the study.
Crystallization of the thoughts enables us to internalize the primary variables in the
model. Additionally, one of the significant contributions of this part is to construct
a relation between global games and taxation, so, this part tries to construe the
substantive and methodological importance of global games within public policy lit-
erature. Moreover, in this chapter, I will discuss the term Keynesian beauty contest4
which enlarges the tax payment issue out of the boundaries of the relation between
individuals and the state by focusing on the interaction among individuals. This
term gives insights about the way in which people make political decisions. In other
words, this term reveals the point that people optimize their positions based on the
current political environment by trying to estimate other people’s reactions because
these reactions also have an influence on their utilities. Lastly, this part of the study
elaborates on political fundamentals. This term enables this analysis to point out the
effects of political institutions as an exogenous factor on individuals’ tax incentive.
As mentioned above, this study accepts political fundamentals as basic political insti-
4Keynes makes up this term to construct an analogy between a beauty con-
test and financial markets through which he underlines the fact that investors’ de-
cisions also depend on other investors’ actions since all of them play the same
game. https://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/04/business/economy/on-wall-st-a-keynesian-beauty-
contest.html
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tutions since the quality of (political) institutions as the body of implementing laws
and policy may provide economic development and construct fiduciary relation with
individuals (Acemoglu, Robinson and Johnson, 2001 and Rodrik, Subramanian and
Trebbi, 2004). In this realm, this term can be counted as the institutional aspect
of government efficiency based on Hauner and Kyobe’s (2010) discussion. Before
elaborating on the institutional perspective, elaborating on other factors that may
determine government efficiency enables us to explain political fundamentals more
clearly. Afonso, Schuknecht and Tanzi (2006) and Hall and Jones (1999) focus on
the effects of education level and years of schooling on government efficiency re-
spectively. Mauro (1995) attaches importance to the control of corruption. Even
though these concepts may have a relationship with the institutional aspect of gov-
ernment efficiency as Hauner (2010) et al. asserts, defining political fundamentals
requires a broader definition. Gellner (1994) and Putnam (1993), in this regard,
set institutional determinants of government efficiency based on the degree of de-
velopment of civil society, which makes the public sector more effective by boosting
the state-society interaction and constructing a control mechanism over bureaucracy
and politics with the help of the civil society organizations. However, even if this
institutional frame enables us to explain the voluntary tax mechanism that political
fundamentals can provide, it cannot refer to tax enforcement which has directly re-
lated to political fundamentals. Also, the point related to the voluntary mechanism
that this study focuses on is the institutional frame which construes the role of im-
personal trust in tax compliance. Hence, rather than focusing on cultural aspect of
institutions, digging out economic and political frames of it would be more useful
to delineate political fundamentals because this term does not aim to measure the
impact of social capital on tax revenue, instead political fundamentals is a way of
increasing tax revenues through the officeholders’ propositions to protect justice and
property rights (North, 1990 and Olson, 1993).
In this respect, the rule of law and horizontal accountability are two basic concepts
that can define political fundamentals. Before arguing in detail the connection be-
tween these concepts and taxation, I will explain both of them. The rule of law, in a
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Hayekian sense, is a kind of instrument that minimizes uncertainties while people en-
gage in economic activities. Without focusing technical structure of this term. Hayek
understands this concept as a way of limiting government actions and of making pre-
dictable how central authority might use its coercive power (Hayek, 1944, p. 75-77).
In this respect, Raz (2009)’s principles of the rule of law, the independence of the
judiciary, the stability of law and restraining crime-preventing agencies’ perverting
attempts, can clarify the Hayek’s main point. O’Donnell (2004) also underlines the
way in which the rule of law stabilizes political rights and regulations. Hence, this
term explains the conditions of decision making processes within state institutions
and makes the state apparatus impartial. O’Donnell (2004) states that
By "fairly applied" I mean that the administrative application or judicial adjudication of legal rules
are consistent across equivalent cases; is made without taking into consideration the class, status,
or relative amounts of power held by the parties in such cases; and applies procedures that are
pre-established, knowable, and allow a fair chance for the views and interests at stake in each case
to be properly voiced (p. 33).
In this way, the rule of law as one of the pieces of political fundamentals is a means of
compensating uncertainties for economic activities, providing contract enforcement
and protecting property rights. In this way, the rule of law sets specific rules the
relations between the state-individuals and individuals among each other.
Another dimension of political fundamentals is horizontal accountability. This con-
cept, in addition to emphasizing the judicial independence, enables us to construe the
other constitutional constraint for executive power (Diamond, 2003). Parliament and
independent state institutions provide a check and balance mechanism which creates
safe-zone for the group those cannot be articulated into political power since hor-
izontal accountability improves the quality of politics by guaranteeing to monitor,
inspect and provide a punishment mechanism for any corrupt action of governments
(O’Donnell, 1999 and Schedler, 1999).
Actually, these two concepts are related to whether the state can build impersonal
trust among individuals and between the state and individuals to increase its tax
revenue. In this regard, this study prefers to focus on law is because law can create
rational expectations in micro-level about what governments can do in macro-levels
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(Hardin, 1993, 9-12). However, in addition to law, creating rational-expectation
and constructing impersonal trust among the state and individuals have some pre-
requisites. Even though Levi (1993) states these items as the conditions to state
interpersonal trust, most of them also can be used to elaborate the concept of imper-
sonal trust between the state and individuals.5 In this sense, the state can construct
impersonal trust by providing credible information and guarantees, effective and fair
law enforcement and competent and relatively honest bureaucracy. Thus, political
fundamentals reflect the current political environment and reveal whether the state
institutions are capable of providing impersonal trust for individuals.
After sorting out the basic framework of political fundamentals based on the con-
cepts, the rule of law and horizontal accountability, in this paragraph, I will briefly
elaborate the relationship between individuals’ tax incentive and political fundamen-
tals. Since this factor empowers institutional frame that enlarges the safe-zone in
political area for the excluded group by the office holders and enables societies (with-
out separating people based on the connection with a political power) to control and
to trust governments’ tax and public policies, a potential improvement in political
fundamentals increases people’s tax incentives.6
Moreover, we focus on Keynesian beauty contest and the importance of this term for
individuals’ incentives to pay taxes. Keynes (1936) states that
It is not a case of choosing those which, to the best of one’s judgment, are the prettiest, nor even
those which average opinion genuinely thinks the most beautiful. We have reached the third de-
gree where we devote our bits of intelligence to anticipating what average view expects the average
idea to be. And there are some, I believe, who practice the fourth, fifth and higher degrees. (pp, 156)
Keynesian beauty contest gives prominence to other people’s opinions while an indi-
vidual makes a decision which may create negative externality especially for activities
5(Impersonal) trust is like a trivet. Someone trusts someone with something. In this study,
this sentence refers that individuals trust political institutions, depending on the quality of the rule
of law and horizontal accountability, and office holders for their capability of using tax revenue
effectively.
6Weingast (1997) underlines the importance of political institutions to reach Pareto optimal
solution for societies suffer from coordination problems. Pareto optimal solution, in his account,
is to provide a consensus which forces the state not to transgress the groups’ rights. Additionally,
political institutions have power to limit the incumbents’ power to prevent them from subverting
the system to exclude their opponents from the next electoral competition. For detailed discussion,
see Przeworski (1991).
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that require a collective decision. Specifically, contributions to public good provi-
sion examples are ordinary moments at which the potential threat of other people’s
reluctance to aid forces an individual not to assist neither. Thus, this term pushes
people to think about what other people think and they decide based on an average
opinion, so, it may create negative externality because of its potential to eliminate
people’s first choices. In this context, the beauty contest reveals that in addition to
the state-individuals relation, individuals’ tax incentives also has a close connection
with other people’s decisions. In other words, average opinion based on the context
of this study refers to a society’s expected average tax payment which may influence
individuals’ tax decisions. It can also create negative externality because while an
individual wants to pay tax, her expected average tax payment of the society states
that people do not want to pay and she follows the society, this average opinion
creates negative externality.
Additionally, the beauty contest term, as mentioned above, reveals the individual-
individual connection on people’s tax decisions. In addition to the state-individual
connection which will be discussed within the context of political fundamentals, indi-
vidual interactions among people is significant to understand the potential deviation
of public opinion from the realities of political fundamentals. In other words, whereas
the dissemination of public information about the current political conjuncture, for
instance, is the same for all individuals, the way of understanding can be differenti-
ated among individuals.7 This differentiation may end up with a separation between
the proposition of public information about political fundamentals and public opin-
ion about these fundamentals. As a result, while the state is capable of conducting an
effective public policy, the society’s opinion about the state ability would be totally
opposite or vice versa. In this regard, an individual needs to decide by controlling
not only the state capability of conducting effective public policy, but also she needs
to check other people’s expected actions.
Therefore, introducing global games and explaining the reason why this game theo-
retic methodology is beneficial for understanding individuals’ tax decisions are nec-
7As Michael Polanyi (2009) says that all knowledge has tacit dimensions.
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essary. Global games are static and incomplete information coordination games con-
taining strategic complements which refer to sets of actions that the action of players
is mutually beneficial for the marginal payoffs of each player (Jorge and Rocha, 2014).
An important step for this methodology is Morris and Shin’s (2000) article which
briefly states that eliminating the common knowledge about fundamentals and re-
vealing noisy private signals leads to uncertainty. This indeterminacy destroys perfect
coordination and sufficiently high private signals can obtain unique equilibrium. In
this sense, since global games can propose a unique equilibrium, the decision-making
process for an individual whether she would like to pay can be framed based on this
game theoretic methodology. More precisely, even though paying taxes is mutually
beneficial for every individual, coordination failure creates inefficient solution since
they have two Nash equilibriums (every person pays taxes or none of them pays).8
Whereas deciding to pay is Pareto superior, non-excludability of public good provi-
sion forces them not to pay. Hence, this study asserts that eliminating coordination
failure and reaching a unique equilibrium is possible with the help of creating noise
with public and private signals about political fundamentals. Nevertheless, since the
sources of information are different, the difference of the information levels between
private and public sources may lead to a change in the equilibrium, which will be
elaborated in the discussion part.
In conclusion, this part of the study attempts to elaborate theoretical frame used
in the analysis. In this sense, I tried to discuss how global games can be used to
scrutinize individuals’ incentives to pay taxes. Also, a significant concept, political
fundamentals, for this study is crystallized based on the institutional understanding
of government efficiency discussion. After sorting out the connection between tax-
payers’ willingness to pay and political fundamentals, the term Keynesian beauty
contest is discussed.
8This model is different from prisoner’s dilemma. In this model, the lack of a chance of coop-
eration because of coordination failure would result in a Pareto superior outcome. In prisoner’s
dilemma, the Nash equilibrium is not Pareto optimal and players cannot have a chance to reach
there.
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CHAPTER 4
MODEL
This section illustrates a simultaneous game using the structure elaborated by Morris
and Shin (2002) and Angeletos and Pavan (2004). As mentioned above, individu-
als’ tax decisions lead to collective action problem because of coordination failure.9
Global games, in this sense, propose a solution to eliminate multiple equilibria. This
is why this analysis prefers to set the main structure of this model based on global
games.
Continuum agents are indexed by i which also sets private information and i ∈ the
unit interval [0, 1]. Agents (taxpayers) decide how much money they pay taxes to
maximize their lifetime utility:
U(ti) = θti − 1
2
t2i − (1− λ)(ti − θ)2 − λ(Li − L¯) (4.1)
9Tax enforcement mechanism is a significant variable for an individual’s tax decision. Also,
information about political institution can give the state’s enforcement capacity which may change
people’s tax decisions. Nevertheless, the main aim of this model is to understand people’s reactions
to the signals related to the political conjuncture by focusing on individuals’ tax decisions as a
coordination failure. This structure ignores the free rider problem caused by the lack of enforcement
mechanism but the main concern of this study is to test the power of information - whether it can
resolve coordination failure and encourage people to pay their taxes without threatening them with
a punishment. In this regard, this uni-variate model tries to measure the effect of the quality
of political institutions on individuals’ tax incentive without taking into account their influence on
enforcement mechanism; instead the role of political institutions in this model is to evaluate whether
they can establish an impersonal trust among the state institutions and people. Hence, political
fundamentals are relevant to the efficient use of tax collection and to an auditing mechanism which
controls the office holders the way in which they can use the tax revenue.
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The life-time utility function states that an agent increases her satisfaction depending
on expected level of tax payment according to the political fundamentals while she
also needs to arrange her contribution decision based on other people’s expected
decisions and the current expected level of tax payment according to the political
fundamentals. In other words, whereas Morris and Shin (2002) comes up with a
complementarity at the private level and Angeletos and Pavan (2004) proposes a
complementarity at the social level, since individuals’ tax decisions require a model
taking into consideration the effects of changings at the social and private levels,
this model considers an environment where complementarities exist in both private
and social schemes. In this regard, while an individual attaches importance to the
distance between her decision and the society’s action at the private scheme, the
complementarity at the social dimension forces her to take a position for the sake of
the society’s benefit. In other words, an agent’s motivation in this game is to arrange
her tax decision based on the cost of deviation at the private level and the benefit of
her contribution at the social level.
Tt =
∫ 1
0
tidi (4.2)
Tt indicates the total amount of tax that agents paid. Also, ti ∈ [0, 1] represents
the amount of tax that an agent decides to pay and as Angeletos and Pavan (2004)
modeled the cost of contribution is 1
2
t2i . This cost represents the condition when the
representative agent consumes this amount rather than giving as taxes.
0 < λ < 1 (4.3)
λ is degree of complementarity (Keynesian beauty contest term or second-guess mo-
tive) that motivates taxpayers to position themselves as close as possible what other
people or a representative government does. Since tax payment decision does not
depend on people’s own incentives only, the current political environment and other
people’s willingness to pay is other factors that may influence an agent’s tax plans.
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To clarify this term more precisely, let me explain the functions of L and L¯.
Li =
∫ 1
0
(tj − ti)2dj (4.4)
L¯ =
∫ 1
0
Ljdj (4.5)
Function Lj defines the average distance between i’s action and the action profile
of the whole population where j defines all agents except i and L¯ is an average of
the average individual distances. Also, person i decides her tax amount depending
on the current expected level of tax payment according to the political fundamen-
tals which are exogenous state variable and represented by θ. Additionally, political
fundamentals can be defined as an aggregate variable containing all the relevant in-
formation about the general political environment and this term is a signal for her
on whether she can trust them to conduct an effective public policy or whether she
can trust political institutions to protect her from ineffective public investments of
office holders.
She also takes into consideration the actions of the other individuals. Thus, Keyne-
sian beauty contest component forces people to focus on the actions of others. With
the same perspective, in addition to political fundamentals, rational agents need
to attach importance to what other people do. Hence, this term leads to negative
externality because it may cause of a coordination failure. Insufficient information
misleads agents and they may make false predictions about the political fundamen-
tals and the expected actions of other. Moreover, this term is significant to attach
importance to conditions at which expected actions of society may diverge from the
signals coming from political fundamentals. Lastly, since an individual’s decision
cannot fully depend on other people’s actions or disregarding society’s actions to-
tally is impossible, the extreme points of lambda are socially irrelevant.
Agents do not know the true value of the political fundamental at the period in
which while taxpayers decide whether they will contribute. The actual value will
be realized at the end of the game. Nevertheless, each agent receives an exogenous
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private signal xi with a certain precision rate β, given by
xi = θ +
1√
β
εi (4.6)
where εi is standard normal, independent of θ, and independent and identically
distributed across agents. Additionally, all taxpayers observe public signal with a
precision rate α.
z = θ +
1√
α
ε (4.7)
where ε is standard normal and independent of θ and εi. Another significant clari-
fication that the analysis should do in this part is to explain the logic behind why
individuals separately receive public and private signals about political fundamen-
tals. State institutions release information via their managers, political actors or the
state media organs directly or they serve information to independent media resources
indirectly. Individuals also are capable of obtaining information through their private
information sources. Their friends from social media, families, civil society organi-
zations that they are enrolled, their occupations or personal experiences that they
contact with state institutions may give clues about political fundamentals. Since
private information resources may differentiate among people, the level of informa-
tion they have is also different. Also, theoretically, an individual may decide based
on public signals only because of the lack of private information resources, but in
practice, it is almost improbable. Moreover, receiving two types of information may
affect people’s decisions depending on the change in the precision levels of intelli-
gence and these levels may have negative impacts on individuals’ tax decisions based
on the relative value of private/public information.
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CHAPTER 5
EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS
Each taxpayer decides ti to maximize her expected utility conditional on the available
information, Ei
[
ui(ti)|xi, z
]
. This decision-making process results as;
ti =
3− 2λ
3
Ei[θ|xi, z] + 2λ
3
Ei[t¯|xi, z] (5.1)
With respect to this setting, an agent i has the belief about θ conditional on xi and z
such that it is normally distributed with mean αz+βxi
α+β
and variance 1
α+β
(See Appendix
A). In this respect, as Morris and Shin (2002) proved that taxpayers’ decisions on
contribution with respect to private and public information and equilibrium tax-
payment decision strategies are linear. Also, this equilibrium is unique (See Appendix
B).
ti =
3− 2λ
3
Ei[θ|xi, z] + 2λ
3
Ei[t¯|xi, z] (5.2)
ti = hxi + (1− h)z where h ∈ R (5.3)
and
t¯ =
∫ 1
0
tjdj (5.4)
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so,
h =
(3− 2λ)β
3α + (3− 2λ)β and ti =
(
(3− 2λ)βxi + 3αz
)
(
3α + (3− 2λ)β
) (5.5)
Change in individual i’s tax decision with respect to the precision of information
sources and the relative value of them is indicated below. These results, basically,
revealed that the effect of the precision level of information depends on the relative
value of information sources.
∂ti
∂β
> 0 ,
∂ti
∂α
< 0 and
∂ti
∂λ
< 0 if xi − z > 0 (5.6)
Based on the above optimal tax payment strategy, the expected social welfare con-
ditional on the political fundamental is as follows (See Appendix C);
W (θ) =
∫ 1
0
uidi (5.7)
E
[
W (θ)
]
=
θ2
2
− ψ (5.8)
ψ =
(
3
2
− λ
)[
(1− h)2 1
α
+ h2
1
β
]
(5.9)
Then,
∂E
[
W (θ)
]
∂λ
> 0 ,
∂E
[
W (θ)
]
∂β
> 0 but
[
W (θ)
]
∂α
> 0 if α >
(3− 2λ)(4λ− 3)β
9
(5.10)
means that public precision within a specific range may have a negative impact on
social welfare.
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CHAPTER 6
DISCUSSION
As mentioned in the first section of the analysis, the model is the combination of
Morris and Shin (2002) and Angeletos and Pavan (2004). The former model sets a
strategic complement which forces agents to follow other actors in the game. The
latter model’s strategic complement provides positive externality to attract players
acting together. While making decision, agents will punish if they deviate from the
current political conjuncture and from the expected actions of other people because
individuals’ tax decisions are totally related to other people’s actions and the quality
of state institutions. Nevertheless, the conditions at which public opinion (average
individual action in the society) and the quality of political fundamentals diverge
may lead to a loss depending on the value of the beauty contest term. Also, an
individual’s tax decision depends on positive externality that correlates positively
with an increase in the number of contributors. Since individuals’ tax decisions, in
this context, require the both types of the strategic complements, this study prefers
to combine them.
The results of our model is different from Angeletos and Pavan (2004) in the context
of the positive effect of threshold point of the precision level of public information
on social welfare. Whereas they state that the precision level at every point has
a positive influence on welfare our results indicate that the precision level below a
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certain point may change the welfare negatively because Angeletos and Pavan (2004)
attach importance to strategic complements at the social level which creates positive
externality but this study takes into consideration the potential negative externality
because of Keynesian beauty contest at the private level. The difference of our model
from Morris and Shin (2002) stems from their exclusion of strategic complements at
the social level. Hence, the threshold in Morris and Shin’s (2002) model sets a max-
imum point, our model proposes a minimum threshold point for the precision level
of public information.
In our model, coordination failure may occur because of individuals’ actions with-
out taking into consideration the current political environment and other agents’
tax behavior because the multiple equilibria may take place in which nobody would
contribute, or people pay taxes that equal to the level of political fundamentals; the
latter is Pareto superior to the former. In this setting, global games enable us to
reach a unique equilibrium by creating uncertainty and releasing public and private
signals. In the model, political fundamentals and the beauty contest are strategic
complements. Agents’ tax returns increase while political fundamentals improve and
Keynesian beauty contest forces them to set their actions based on other agents and
the state’s actions. Also, in the model, social welfare function states that society
makes a certain amount of fixed return from their total tax payment because under-
lying political fundamentals create a positive externality. Even though the beauty
contest does not influence the social welfare since
∫ 1
0
(Li − L¯)di = 0, it creates nega-
tive externality by changing individuals’ decisions. In this sense, the beauty contest
has two opposite effects. On the one hand, it is an effective tool to get rid of coordi-
nation failure problem by forcing them to take into account other people’s decisions.
If individual i does not follow other agents’ agents, the difference between their tax
decisions and her payment leads to a negative return to her. On the other hand, it
may create negative externality since it blocks people’s first best actions by forcing
them to focus on what other people would do.
The effect of the precisions of public and private signals on individual i’s tax deci-
sion depends on the level of signals she receives. If a private signal is bigger than the
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other, the precision of public signals decreases individual i’s tax incentive and vice
versa. Also, the second-guess motive decreases individual i’s tax payment for the
case where private information is greater than the public one. In this setting, iden-
tifying the point that leads to a difference between public and private information is
important. Since people receive the same public information, the relative variation
between them is connected with the size of people’s private information. The reason
of the private information differentiation among people is basically related to their
networks to policymakers, integrations to social life, the ways of keeping up to day,
social media and the internet usage and their occupations.
When we come back to Keynesian beauty contest discussion, there are two significant
points that the study should elaborate. First, as mentioned above, beauty contest
reveals individual-individual relations of tax decisions. If we focus on the extreme
cases where λ = 1 or λ = 0 (even if they are not possible as discussed in the chapter
3), λ = 1 reveals that the state-individual connection becomes trivial. The case
λ = 0 disregards the importance of the other people’s actions and directs individuals
to attach importance to the state’s decisions. Second, the change in individuals’ tax
incentives with respect to the beauty contest also depends on the relation between
the exogenous public and private signals. In this case, the beauty contest term has
a positive effect on an individual’s tax incentive until the point where public signals
are greater than the private one and vice versa because people’s incentives to coop-
erate requires a guidance which is public knowledge. An environment where private
knowledge is greater than the public one increases heterogeneity and the incentive
to act collectively may end up with an inefficient result. Focusing on an extreme
case at which there is no available public information enables us to understand the
effects of the second-guess motive on an individual’s tax incentive. Even though the
second-guess motive has the power to motivate people to collaborate, coordinating
them into a better solution is only possible via public information since every person
has a chance to take the same information. Nevertheless, using private information
which leads to information differentiation may cause misunderstanding among peo-
ple and this condition ends up with tax evasion. Hence, people require higher public
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information to guarantee to match up their actions with other people’s decisions.
After analyzing the effects of the Keynesian beauty contest and the precision of pub-
lic and private information on individuals’ tax incentives, the analysis will sort out
welfare effects of these factors. First of all, when we control the effect of political
fundamentals on welfare, it is seen that an improvement in political fundamentals
has positively influence welfare, but the study cannot explain the relative impacts of
voluntary contribution and tax enforcement mechanisms. While we construe the pre-
cisions of public and private information, what we find is the same with Morris and
Shin (2002) and is slightly different from Angeletos and Pavan (2004). Private sig-
nals always have a positive impact on social welfare function as usual. Nevertheless,
unlike Angeletos and Pavan’s (2004) discussion, transparency of public information
does not always change welfare positively. The impact of precision of public infor-
mation becomes negative under a certain limit. This limit depends on Keynesian
beauty contest if the precision of private signal stays the same. In this sense, since
α ∈ IR+ , public information has a positive effect if the second-guess motive is less
than 0.75, but it may have a detrimental effect on the welfare for any point of the
beauty contest below a certain threshold level after the second-guess motive is be-
tween 0.75 and 1.10 While the beauty contest term converges to 1, the threshold for
the precision of public signal gets bigger. The logic of the change in the threshold
level with respect to the second-guess motive is clear. An increase in the beauty
contest term empowers people’s incentives to cooperate. Policy makers may canalize
this motivation into a positive action by disseminating public information. Never-
theless, the lower transparency level of public information may create ambiguity and
tax evasion would be a collective action. If we take the precision of private informa-
tion as a non-stable variable, the result has changed a little bit. Per ten thousand
change in the precision of private information makes the increase in the threshold
level slower than the first case. While the rate of change of the threshold level for
the precision of public information becomes slower comparing to the fixed private
10This threshold is obtained after a couple of mathematical derivations. The main importance of
the above numbers is to indicate that the transparency level of public information should be higher
than a threshold level to have a positive effect on welfare.
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Figure 1: Percentage Change in Social Welfare
precision, the absolute value of the threshold gets bigger because private information
may lead to information differentiation among people, which threatens the potential
of the collective tax payment incentives.
While we construe how an increase in the precision level of private information may
change the welfare effect of the precision level of public information, the above graph
indicates that the rate of change in welfare with respect to public precision, its
acceleration rate is fixed, decreases because of the transparency level of private in-
formation. In other words, this illustration reveals that the transparency level of
private information has a crowding out effect on the public precision and it limits
the welfare effect of public information. A significant contribution of this argument
is that advanced private information networks force public institutions to be more
transparent to improve social welfare.
Moreover, analyzing the extreme cases enable us to clarify the impacts of public
and private information and the second-guess motive on the welfare function. Since
private information always improves welfare, the analysis will control the below sit-
uation;
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E
[
W (θ)|θ, β = 0
]
=
θ2
2
−
(
3
2
− λ
)
α
and
∂ψ
∂α
> 0 for ∀ α ∈ IR+ (6.1)
The case when there are no private information sources, public information improves
welfare without depending on any conditions because individuals do not have any
other information option to compare.
Another case is that there is no Keynesian beauty contest.
E
[
W (θ)|θ, α = 0
]
=
θ2
2
− 3
2(α + β)
and
∂ψ
∂β
> 0 and
∂ψ
∂α
> 0 for ∀ α, β ∈ IR+
(6.2)
In this condition, the threshold pressure on public information demolishes and every
public signal without depending on its transparency level has a positive effect on
welfare since public information resources do not have any externality that forces
them to be more precise.
While we control the case when the precision levels of both information resources go
to infinity, the result would be as follows;
lim
β→∞
W (θ) = lim
α→∞
W (θ) =
θ2
2
(6.3)
The above outcome reveals that the transparency levels after a certain point do not
have any power over welfare. The only variable that may change social welfare is
the current political fundamentals. This result may state the limit of information
dissemination, but this discussion is out of the topic of this study.
Lastly, this analysis elaborates on the effect of the beauty contest on the social welfare
function. As stated in the equilibrium analysis part, the social welfare function has
a positive relationship with the Keynesian beauty contest. As discussed above, the
beauty contest term has two opposite effects in this model. On the one hand, it forces
people to think about what other people think, so, this term has a role in providing
coordination among agents. On the other hand, this variable may create negative
externality by eliminating the first possible actions for people. While we focus on the
change of the welfare function with respect to the beauty contest, the model states
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that the positive effect of this concept as a strategic complement is bigger than the
potential adverse effect.
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CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSION
This thesis investigated the impact of the transparency level of public and private in-
formation resources about political fundamentals on individuals’ tax decision, social
welfare and the collective action problem with respect to tax contributions based
on the frame of global games. In this way, the study tried to figure out how the
availability of information affects coordination failure problem based on tax evasion.
Nevertheless, since the information resources contain noisy signals, this analysis pro-
posed strategic complements, namely political fundamentals and Keynesian beauty
contest. While political fundamentals revealed the current political environment from
the institutional perspective by using the terms rule of law and horizontal account-
ability, the beauty contest term measures the level of the collective action incentive
among people. The first term provides insights about whether office holders can
manage a compelling public policy and the second concept forces people to decide
as close as possible to what other people think.
Political fundamentals are stated as an exogenous factor which analyzes the institu-
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tional frame of the state apparatus by concentrating on the rule of law and horizontal
accountability. Additionally, this term defined the state-individual dimension of the
tax decision process. The second term, the Keynesian beauty contest, is another
strategic complement which forces people to think about what other people would
do. While this concept created the second-guess motive for taxpayers, it also under-
lines the importance of the individual-individual aspect of tax decision process.
After the crystallization of basic concepts and introducing the benchmark model of
the thesis, this work sorted out the equilibrium analysis by concentrating on the
impacts of the change in the precision of public and private information, Keynesian
beauty contest and the extreme cases to sort out the role of information trans-
parency in getting rid of coordination failure during tax decision process. Moreover,
the analysis discussed the effect of information precision on welfare. In this realm,
the influence of the precision of information resources on individuals’ tax payments
depends on conditions. If an individual can reach more public information than the
private one, shifting up the transparency level of public information improves her
tax incentives and vice versa. The second-guess motive (Keynesian beauty contest)
may also increase an individual’s tax payment if the available public information is
more than her private information because public knowledge can convince people to
pay their taxes by guiding their incentives to act collectively. The reason behind
this relation is simple. Private information has the power to diminish uncertainties
for an individual and she may not require coordination motive anymore. Briefly,
the domination of private information resources decreases the importance of public
signals and coordination motives; rather these factors may lead to destroying indi-
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viduals’ tax incentives. While the analysis concentrates on the welfare effect of these
indicators, the results are similar to Morris and Shin’s (2002) propositions. Since
the second-guess motive prevents extreme actions, an increase in this term may lead
to improving the welfare. As discussed in the theoretical part, while the beauty
contest term as a strategic complement can limit extreme actions and force people
to coordinate, it may also create negative externality because people give up their
first choices that can be Pareto superior comparing to what they did. However, the
welfare effect of the beauty contest reveals that this term as a strategic complement
compensates the potential danger of the negative externality problem. The welfare
effect of public precision is ambiguous as Morris and Shin (2002) indicates. While
we focus on extreme cases where there is no second-guess motive or no available
private information, public information improves welfare regardless of its precision
level. Nevertheless, while the beauty contest is zero, but there are available pri-
vate information sources, the impact of public information becomes less important.
Even though the transparency level of public signals still shifts up welfare, private
information resources have a crowding out effect. When the beauty contest term is
not zero, public information would be socially undesirable within a specific precision
level. This condition provides significant insights into the relationship between the
coordination motive and the role of political institutions. An increase in coordina-
tion motives means an increase in the incentive of collective action for people during
tax decision process. However, if public unities cannot provide enough information
or they cannot be transparent as they should be, this collective action motive may
lead to encourage people to evade taxes jointly. Also, this condition reveals the fact
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that even though Angeletos and Pavan (2004)’s results support the idea that full
transparency of public information is always beneficial, this model obtains a differ-
ent output.
To sum up, this study concluded that individuals’ tax incentives depend on condi-
tional relations between information resources whereas the beauty contest and trans-
parency of private information always have a positive impact on the social welfare.
Nevertheless, the influence of the precision of public information on social welfare
may change depending on people’s incentive to cooperate. Also, an increase in the
transparency level of private information leads to a decrease in the positive impact
of the precision of public information on social welfare because it increases hetero-
geneity which rasps the welfare effect of public information. Lastly, even though
this analysis explicitly discusses the dimensions of tax decision process by reveal-
ing the relationship between the state-individual and the individual-individual, the
model cannot explain its theoretical frame debating about political fundamentals
which contain voluntary contribution and tax enforcement mechanisms because this
study defined political fundamentals as a one-dimensional function. For the further
studies, analyzing the influence of the change in these mechanisms on individual tax
decisions and welfare by defining political fundamentals as a function of voluntary
contribution and tax enforcement structures based on slippery slope framework will
generate exciting results.
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APPENDIX A
Conditional Expectation of Bivariate Normal Distribution
Lemma 1 Let y and x be a b-variate normal distribution.[
y
x
]
∼ N
([
Ey
Ex
]
,
[
Vy Vyx
Vxy Vx
])
the conditional expectation and variance of y are given as:
E(y|x) = Ey + Vyx
V x
(x− Ex) and V ar(y|x) = Vy −
V 2yx
V x
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APPENDIX B
Individual i’s Optimal Tax Strategy
Assume that individual i’s tax decision strategy is linear in public and private signals.
ti = hxi + (1− h)z
The optimum tax decision can be found as follows:
arg max
ti
Ei[Ui(t− i|xi, z) = θti − 1
2
t2i − (1− λ)(ti − θ)2 − λ(Li − L¯)]
F.O.C. ti = Ei(θ|xi, z) + Ei
[
− 2(1− λ)(ti − θ)− λ
(∂Li
∂ti
− ∂L¯
∂ti
)]
∂L¯
∂ti
= 0 since individual i cannot affect L¯ and define t¯ =
∫ 1
0
tjdj so;
∂Li
∂ti
=
∂
∂ti
( ∫ 1
0
(tj − ti)2dj
)
= −2( ∫ 1
0
tjdj −
∫ 1
0
tidj
)
= 2(ti − t¯)
ti = Ei(θ|xi, z)− 2(1− λ)ti + 2(1− λ)Ei(θ|xi, z)− 2λti + 2λEi(t¯|xi, z)
3ti = (3− 2λ)Ei(θ|xi, z) + 2λEi(t¯|xi, z)
Ei(t¯|xi, z) = Ei(
∫ 1
0
tj(z)dj|xi, z) = Ei(
∫ 1
0
[hxj + (1− h)z]dj|xi, z)
where Ei(xj|xi, z) = αz+βxiα+β so;
Ei(t¯|xi, z) = h(αz + βxi
α + β
) + (1− h)z
3ti = (3− 2λ)
(αz + βxi
α + β
)
+ 2λ
(
h
αz + βxi
α + β
+ (1− h)z)
3ti
[
(3− 2λ)β + 2λhβ
α + β
]
xi +
[
(3− 2λ)α
α + β
]
z
since ti = hxi + (1− h)z
h =
(3− 2λ)β + 2λhβ
3(α + β)
3αh+ 3βh− 2αhβ = (3− 2λ)β
h =
(3− 2λ)β
3α + (3− 2λ)β)
ti =
(3− 2λ)βxi + 3αz
3α(α + (3− 2λ)β)
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APPENDIX C
Social Welfare Function
W (θ) =
∫ 1
0
uidi =
∫ 1
0
[
θti − 1
2
t2i − (1− λ)(ti − θ)2 − λ(Li − L¯)
]
di∫ 1
0
(Li − L¯)di = 0
E(W (θ)|θ) = θE(
∫ 1
0
tidi)− 1
2
E(
∫ 1
0
t2i di)− (1− λ)E[(
∫ 1
0
t2i − 2tiθ + θ2)]di
= θE(T |θ)− (3
2
− λ)E(
∫ 1
0
t2i di) + (1− λ)θ2
E(T |θ) = E(hθ + (1− h)z|θ) = θ
E(T 2|θ) = V AR(T |θ) + E(T |θ)2 = (1− h)2 1
α
+ θ2 −
∫ 1
0
t2i di
=
∫ 1
0
(T 2 − 2tiT )di −
∫ 1
0
(t2i + T
2 − 2tiT )di
= −T 2 −
∫ 1
0
(ti − T )2di = −T 2 − h2
∫ 1
0
(xi − θ)2di = −T 2 − h
2
β
E(W |θ) = θ
2
2
− ψ
ψ = (
3
2
− λ)((1− h)2
α
+
h2
β
)
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